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Interpassivity and the 
uncanny illusions of our 
daily lives   
Rodrigo Gonsalves  
 
 
An Introduction on Interpassivity: it looks like an illusion, it feels like 
an illusion, do not be fooled - it is an illusion. 
 
Pfaller's book Interpassivity - The Aesthetics of Delegated Enjoyment (2017) 
provides us with a detailed theoretical examination of interpassivity and its 
impact within culture. More than a 'mental experiment' the notion of 
interpassivity not only provides a theoretical workframe, but it also renders a 
practice. The fundamental tension provided from within interpassivity, fills the 
necessary requirements to properly examine some of the deemed mysterious 
and curious elements of the civilised post-modern existence. With this 
investigation, the author provided a theoretical perspective that opened up 
different possibilities of approaching or re-approaching crucial elements for 
many different fields, as well as, provoked an opening to many insightful 
articulations. From philosophy, psychoanalysis, art theory, literature, and now 
reaching many others fields, the consequences of interpassivity and its 
productive provocations seems like a crucial theoretical element for 
knowledge nowadays.  
 
 Through the notion of interpassivity, Pfaller prescribes an explanation to 
some of the most fascinating behaviors within our culture: magical acts 
performed by civilized, enlightened individuals. Well, in order to investigate and 
to formulate the structural mechanisms of such concept, the author relates it to 
the unperceived magical acts which are performed by civilized individuals, 
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developing a dedicated examination of rituals and finally, to the peculiar 
capability of delegating enjoyment through interpassive gestures. Borrowing 
from Mladen Dolar's (cf. Dolar 1991: 6) explanation of the Lacanian development 
of extimate1, one could say that interpassive behavior has a remarkable 
extimate aspect bound to it. To certain extent, interpassivity is a theoretical 
designation that aims at the blurred lines of reality and illusions for the subject. 
Pfaller posits that: "Interpassivity is thus a strategy of escaping identification 
and consequently subjectivisation...Interpassivity is therefore either an anti-
ideological behaviour, or it is a second, and entirely different, type of ideology 
that does not rest on becoming a subject." (Pfaller 2017: 8) Forcibly, such 
extimate quality of interpassivity, provides unexpected answers to previous 
models, ideologies and so on.  
 
 Although the book renders a profound examination of this complex 
theoretical development and covers its depth by going through many different 
directions and possibilities, some fundamentally uncanny questions formulated 
by the author could lead the way, given the overall idea of what such notion 
seeks to designate. These are some of the questions that seem to resonate 
through a large portion of this research: "Why do we prefer to live through some 
irrelevant other instead of enjoying directly, by ourselves?" (Pfaller, p.50) or 
formulated like this: "Can the experience of pleasure be delegated in the same 
way as some other feelings or convictions?" (Pfaller 2017: 33); "...what is the 
connection between the present agent and the absent person?" (Pfaller 2017: 
33) and finally, "Can my representing agent also let him or herself be 
represented by someone (or something) else? And for whom does that new 
agent then experience the pleasure – for the other agent or for me?" (Pfaller 
2017: 33) Comparing them, one could notice how such questions encapsulate 
this mysterious element of a complex extimate relation between the subject, 
enjoyment and illusions.  
 
 Most of the examples given to illustrate such phenomena, although 
diverse tend to preserve a certain logic of extimacy. From the Žižekean 
understanding of the Tibetan prayer wheels2, to Kafka's "drinking mates" that 
enjoyed a cold beverage when he could not3, and also, considering the example 
of the intellectuals that enjoy their printed copies of books they were meant to 
read - the fundamental element of delegated enjoyment to others (could be 
things or people) is sustained by the interpassive subject. Pfaller's investigation 
of this phenomena starts with the approach to the Freudian notion of 
'substitutive act'. Interpreting that a 'partial relief from the tension that had 
originally been connected with the wish to read the book' (Pfaller 2017: 38). 
Therefore, to deal with this possibility of secretly investing psychic energy in an 
act, while (unknowingly) aiming at another, gives to the interpassive person the 
possibility of experiencing pleasure through substitution. Such logic is familiar 
to Freud's development of fetishism and obsessional neurosis, but Pfaller 
invites Mannoni's interpretations in order to present a broader render of such 
element into human behavior (Pfaller 2017: 44). A brief overview of 
interpassivity in psychoanalytic terms tells us that a libido-economical reading 
of cultural enjoyment through some aesthetic experiences sets an ambivalent 




reaction for the subject. Following Pfaller's (cf. Pfaller 2017: 44) interpretation, 
such ambivalent experience generates an intrapsychic conflict to the ego, that 
instead of aiming at ego-perfecting by identification solves the conflict by 
splitting itself. As Pfaller himself puts it: 'Interpassive acts are, like those of 
obsessional neurosis, substitutive acts that result from an intrapsychic conflict.' 
(Pfaller 2017: 43) So, delegation of enjoyment introduces a relationship 
between the individual and its representatives, not organized by identification 
but rather by a viable solution of pleasure through relief of interpassivity 
behavior which allow for some previously experienced pleasures.   
 
 So, one could say that the investigation of such human features, is on a 
first level, an investigation of specific situations (as seen from the previous 
examples), where someone deals with illusions and its effects. Implying that on 
a second level, those very own illusions operated by interpassive subjects have 
a function. The interpassive person acts through substitution, operating on his 
or her pleasure through an objetal or human substitute4. Such interpassive act 
generates a viable relationship of indirect enjoyment, which could be on one 
hand, simply better than nothing (as seen in Kafka's example), but also, showing 
a potential capability of being even better than the direct enjoyment, since you 
do not have to deal with all the efforts and troubles to achieve such pleasure 
(following the logic behind the example of intellectuals and their passion for 
photocopying books they will, probably or most definitely, never read…). And 
furthermore, it allows on one hand, the possibility of getting rid of an 
intrapsychic conflict which is solved by an external agent/element, and on the 
other hand, rendering a new possibility of dealing with a bygone pleasure. So, a 
peculiar element arises from this equation: the direct relationship is deferred 
for the indirect because of a fundamentally legitimate form of enjoyment that is 
still reached from this interpassive gesture. Therefore, we are dealing here 
with illusions of the everyday life, facing situations where there is 'much more 
than what meets the eye', and interpassivity comes as a tool to provide the 
technical comprehension of such mysterious and curious actions of individuals 
relating to culture.  
 
 Pfaller's development of interpassity as a viable theoretical tool to 
organize and explore different qualities of illusions experienced by subjects, 
made me turn my attention towards what seemed at first place, a somewhat 
suppressed or perhaps hidden element from this more recent investigation. 
And curiously enough, an element which is familiar to Pfaller's line of research. 
Therefore, the present article aims at rendering a closer look at interpassivity 
and another particular effects of illusions previously investigated by Pfaller 
himself, such as the uncanny and comic. In order to do so, we must examine 
mainly a possible common thread between the following works: Interpassivity - 
The Aesthetics of Delegated Enjoyment (2017), On the Pleasure Principle in 
Culture (2014) and The familiar unknown, the uncanny, the comic: The aesthetic 
Effects of the Thought Experiment (2005). After establishing it, and comparing 
its main differences, we will finally move on to investigate the consequences of 
such tension. We could justify this study by presenting the fact that in the most 
recent text (2017) the term uncanny appears only in three different passages, 




providing us with a few questions: could interpassivity had subsumed or 
encompassed the effects once investigated through of the uncanny and comic? 
Are the uncanny and comic effects still a part of what is experience through 
interpassivity? Conversely, could interpassivity provide us with a critical 
reappropriation of the uncanny or the comical?    
 
A possible intersection: the sneeze from the dead  
 
Inspired by an intuition from Žižek5 elaborating on the notion of the interpassive 
subject (cf. Žižek 1998), this article seeks a possible dialogue between those 
different texts from Pfaller, through an interesting element that intersects 
them, which is the example used and developed theoretically by the 
psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni. Basically, the example goes as follows, an actor 
playing the role of a dead person suddenly sneezes on stage and the public 
bursts in laughs. This rather peculiar example, which appears throughout the 
three main texts, could possibly provides ties and insights regarding the 
mechanism of interpassity. In Pfaller's text, The familiar unknown, the uncanny, 
the comic: The aesthetic Effects of the Thought Experiment (2005), the analysis 
of the example is that: 
 
Mannoni acutely analyses the characteristic peculiar to this laugh: the 
audience laughs not because it is freed from the sad conviction that the 
man is dead, but because the actor's sneeze has freed it from the 
obligation to maintain the theatrical illusion. As Mannoni states, 
everything seems to be there in order to generate the illusion, but in 
somebody else - just as if we (the audience) were the actors' 
accomplices. The object of this kind of laugh is not the good news that the 
actor is still alive, but the imaginable astonishment of a naive third party 
who believes in the theatrical illusion and is fooled by audience and actor 
together, and for whom the impression of the dead man's sneeze must 
therefore seem uncanny. 
 
The parameters in this example can easily be changed in such a way that 
the effect of the uncanny arises. Should somebody we assume to be dead 
suddenly sneeze, it would be uncanny for us. Now we play the role of the 
naive person - the third party in Mannoni's example. But our own 
uncanny fright is based on a non-naivety, a suspended illusion. We have 
to overcome the illusion that dead people can sneeze so that the 
experience of an assumed dead person's sneeze can seem uncanny. 
Only in a culture with a tradition of stories about the living (sneezing) 
dead could we have encountered this kind of illusion; and only when we 
have overcome the illusion can we experience the uncanny. Because we 
do not believe in fairytales (familiar to us through our culture) in which 
dead people show signs of life, this kind of sign affects us in an uncanny 
way. (Pfaller 2005: 211) 
 
 This brief, yet insightful essay, explores the dimension of 'thought 
experiments' through the relationship between the uncanny and the comical. 




The fundamental hypothesis pursued is that the comic is what is uncanny for 
others (Pfaller 2005: 212) and reading closely from Freud's own ruminations of 
the uncanny [das unheimlich] (1919), Pfaller articulates four essential elements: 
the occurrence of symbolic causality, success, repetition and the double 
[doppelgänger]. Needless to say, all fundamental elements present in Freud's 
own description of obsessional neurosis (1907) (1909) (1919), but to a certain 
extent, it is also connected to the logic of fetishism (1927) through "fetishist 
disavowal"6. Indeed, something is produced by this ghostly object, from the 
laughter of a corpse being played by the actor, defying the logic of better 
judgment – if we realize that the audience knows it is an actor playing a role – a 
puzzling question emerges: why do they laugh? And, this line of questioning, as 
seen in the further theoretical development by the author, provided the 
foundation to understand the method of interpassivity.  
 
 One of the important exchanges we find here is this non-naive versus 
naive perspective of the viewer. It is through this naive viewer of the play, this 
invisible other, this third-party presented by the example, the one who could 
have been misled by the actor sneezing, feeling uncanniness that sustain the 
illusion to everybody else in audience to feel amused and laugh about it. But 
there is a necessary layer of rationalization taking place here, as the author 
points out, it is only a culture with built tradition of stories about the dead rising 
(or sneezing) that could find such an illusion, and adding to that, only by 
overcoming such illusion can the uncanny element take place. The main point 
here is that we do not believe in fairytales, affecting us with this uncanny 
element.   
 
 The second interaction with Mannoni's example, comes from Pfaller's On 
the Pleasure Principle in Culture (2014), and it goes as follows:  
 
When an actor plays a dead person this structure is less obvious, but, as 
Mannoni detects, it has a similar effect. According to theatrical 
conventions, which in this particular case do not seem to allow much 
theatrical freedom (in contrast to other cases, where,  for example, a 
tea towel is capable of indicating a castle), the actor has to lie there 
without moving. This alone seemed striking to  Mannoni: 'If the actor 
doesn't lie still, would one say that it is obvious that he isn't dead? But 
everyone knows that anyway… nonetheless, everything proceeds as 
though this knowledge has to remain concealed. From whom? But if the 
actor were to get a bit of dust in his or her nose (which no stage 
convention can prevent),  the the 'corpse' would have to sneeze. The 
tension maintained by theatrical convention would then suddenly 
collapse, as Mannoni suggests, and the audience would break into 
laughter. 
 
As he says, just as in the case of the mask cult, in the case of theatre, too, 
it seems to be about an illusion that we are not the victims of, but for 
which we seem to require a victim who - for our satisfaction - is held in 
check by the illusion: 'Everything seems to be set up to produce the 




belief, but for someone else - as though we (the audience) were in 
cahoots with the actors.' In all of these cases - both 'primitive' and 
'civilized' - actors appear who have situated themselves quite close to an 
illusion but repudiate belief in this illusion. Some identify other persons 
by name, in a more or less vague way ('earlier people'), as the carriers of 
this illusion; other are perhaps satisfied with clarifying that they 
themselves are not its carriers. And, finally, others say nothing, but do 
not appear to be the true carriers of such a belief - while simultaneously 
drawing their pleasure from precisely that (Pfaller 2014: 39). 
 
 Pfaller's theoretical development of interpassivity allowed him to 
demonstrate the paradoxical problems regarding illusions without owners. 
This previous passage can be found on the chapter on Belief, which follows an 
entire chapter about Interpassivity7. So, Mannoni's example find its place 
articulated with belief in this book – but, which notion of belief are we 
considering here? Fundamentally, one already present on the first text, but 
further explored here. This naive viewer, this Other (borrowing from the 
Lacanian toolbox of concepts8) seems to be a fundamental piece to this 
equation and its function is further developed in this approach. The author 
supplements his first comprehension regarding Mannoni's example, making it 
clear that this other is essential in order for the interpassive theatricality to 
operate. The scenario provided by this example has all elements at work in 
order to provoke or to guide towards a belief, but a belief for someone else, it is 
only this naive viewer that embraces such illusion, therefore allowing the 
possibility for everyone else to enjoy. In both cases, 'primitive' or 'civilized' 
(mask cult and theater) the structure of illusion prevails and delegation takes 
place; although there are additional layers of knowledge present in the 
'civilized', the delegation still takes place. This exercise of tricking the Other, 
through the illusion of the naive viewer enables for the 'enlightened' viewer his 
or her enjoyment.   
 
 The structural element of belief portrayed by the example, ties this 
paradoxical dimension of interpassivity to its different levels of delegation. The 
author continues exploring the function of illusions without owners by 
considering the notion of croyance following Mannnoni's [1969] development. 
For Mannoni, this term allows the questioning of 'how a belief [croyance] can be 
simultaneously abandoned and retained'. (Pfaller 2014: 37). Pointing out how 
croyance as a term has this "uncanny" like aspect to its linguistic origins. As 
well as the uncanny [unheimlich] in the German language, that makes room for 
opposites to meet, by paradoxically containing both meanings under the 
designation of same term (for instance, being familiar and unfamiliar); in 
French, the term croyance has a 'neutral position between the expressions foi 
('faith') and superstition ('superstition')... (cf. Pfaller 2014: 37) finding no 
corresponding term in the German language. So, one could determine that the 
term croyance by itself, relates to a crucial aspect of the method of 
interpassivity, which is the relationship of abandonment and retainment in the 
realm of illusions. Following Pfaller's understanding, the function of the naive 




other to the viewer and its relationship to illusions, provide us with this missing 
link and viable render of this mechanism of interpassivity.  
 
 So, while following Mannoni who noticed how this term seems missing 
from the index of a Freud volume, Pfaller himself discovers an important 
contribution to his construction of interpassivity, on Freud's struggles with such 
notions regarding the 'Rat Man' (cf.Pfaller 2014: 37):  
 
...'Thus he was at once superstitious and not superstitious; and there was 
a clear distinction between his attitude and the superstition of 
uneducated people who feel themselves at one with their belief.' Here, 
Freud encountered the difficulty of finding an adequate term for the 
peculiar 'educated' form of superstition existing in his analysand. In 
contrast to the 'uneducated believers', his analysand appeared to have 
access to better knowledge, by virtue of which the superstitious belief 
appeared ludicrous to him. (Pfaller 2014: 37)   
 
 Freud's clinical concerns about belief within obsession neurosis sustain 
a metapsychological purpose. As noted by Pfaller, Freud in his essay ‘Obsessive 
Actions and Religious Practices’ [Freud 1907] uses religion to make obsessional 
neurosis understandable and then, "reversing this explicative relationship, 
sheds new light on the dynamics in the history of religion with the help of his 
insights into obsessional neurosis." (Pfaller 2017: 85) In this sense, the 
experience of Freud's obsessional neurotic analysands provided key elements 
surrounding belief and even more essential, elements regarding the ability of 
delegating enjoyment through interpassivity to Pfaller's development. But here, 
there is another puzzling step taken from the first text to the second one. In the 
first essay (2005) the term interpassivity is nowhere to be found, and there is 
only this render of 'thought experiments' through the logic of the uncanny and 
the comic, which explores Mannoni's example of the actor playing dead corpse 
that sneezes on the stage. The second text validates a quintessential element of 
the uncanny, through obsessional neurosis to sustain the logic of interpassivity. 
Then, the approach of belief and the example is articulated – but the 'thought 
experiment' seems overshadowed or almost obliterated. This reversal could 
indicate that the notion of 'thought experiment' could have had operated as the 
blueprint to the development of interpassivity. A more solid argument to backup 
this claim comes from the core of obsessional neurosis and the exploration of 
belief, which are elements that cross this bridge between both essays by the 
author. Some breathtaking aspects about this perspective comes from some 
viable consequences which could be explored, for instance: a) the rehabilitation 
of the uncanny as a clinical component for psychoanalysis through 
interpassivity; b) interpassivity as a homological phenomena to the Lacanian 
object a (through its commonality derived from the uncanny and the Greek 
chorus9) or c) the necessary approach of interpassivity and the Lacanian object 
a from the standpoint of the praxis of psychoanalysis. But, in order to sustain 
such radical conclusions, a proper theoretical study is required, which goes far 
beyond the purpose of the present article.  
 




 So, going back to our line-of-thought, let's take a closer look at Pfaller's 
more recent developments on Interpassivity (2017), specifically to our key 
example: 
 
This principle of pleasure from delegating our wishful attitudes also 
applies to our practices of art and art reception. Octave Mannoni has 
illustrated this with the example of an actor who, while playing the role 
of a dead person, suddenly gets a tickle in the nose from the dust of the 
stage and sneezes. Of course, the spectators burst out in laughter. But, 
Mannoni asks, what are they laughing about? Since they themselves 
knew quite well that the actor was not dead, it seems that they are 
laughing at the imagined astonishment of somebody who did not know 
what they knew (cf. Mannoni 1985a: 163).  
The basic pleasure of a spectator therefore seems to be an interpassive 
one: it consists of creating and splitting off another character who serves 
as a backing for the illusions that one does not share but still finds great. 
Pleasure in art thus turns out to be a pleasure of continuous 
‘disidentification’ (cf. Mannoni 1985b), of splitting off imaginary 
spectators. This has, for example, been noted by Jonathan Culler with 
regard to the pleasure of reading: this pleasure is based on a constant 
‘splittedness’ of the reader who imagines ‘what a reader would think’. 
Reading implies, according to Culler, working ‘with the hypothesis of a 
reader’ (1983: 73). Interpassivity thus appears to be the most general 
structure of aesthetic pleasure. It is not only at work in special cases like 
that of canned laughter where the interpassive medium is strikingly 
manifest. It also underlies the allegedly normal forms of art observation: 
even in such normal cases, the observation is constantly delegated to 
‘invisible observers’ or ‘implicit readers’. This delegation is a necessary 
precondition for aesthetic pleasure. A theory of interpassivity is 
therefore the key to a general aesthetic theory.Yet the consequences of 
Mannoni’s discoveries could cause a major theoretical revolution not 
only for aesthetics, but also for mass psychology. For they indicate that 
social groups can be held together by the pleasures provided by 
delegation. Interpassivity would thus prove to be a key for the 
understanding of libidinal mass-bondings. (Pfaller 2017: 44-45)  
 
 More than a simple addition to the previous constructions on 
interpassivity, here Mannoni's example illustrates a basic pleasure of the 
spectator regarding the aesthetic pleasure. Here, the 'special' cases and the 
'normal' forms of aesthetic pleasure are at work. In the first case, the 
interpassivity medium seems to operate, while in the 'normal' form of aesthetic 
appreciation, the delegation to 'invisible observers' appears. But in both cases, 
the delegation seems necessary "precondition" for aesthetic pleasure and 
Mannoni's example opens the possibility of covering more grounds than the 
aesthetic theory – it leads towards mass psychology. Now, we can see how this 
term can be used to infer peculiar mass-bondings through delegated pleasure 
and moves on from being this essential notion for aesthetic theory, it becomes a 




functional theoretical element to consider the quality of transference, in 
psychoanalytic terms, to other social and cultural situations.   
 
 And if we are considering this particular example from Mannoni, the 
thinker who cannot be left out from this conversation is Alenka Zupančič. The 
philosopher answers to Pfaller's The familiar unknown, the uncanny, the comic: 
The aesthetic Effects of the Thought Experiment (2005) study, in an article from 
the same year called Reversals of Nothing: The case of the sneezing corpse. 
Objectively, her answer to Mannoni's example is that:  
 
There are some grounds for challenging Mannoni’s reading of theatrical 
illusion as basically following the scheme of “fetishist disavowal” or 
delegated belief (we know better than to believe this or that, but we keep 
on believing it by delegating this belief to the Other(s), by presupposing it 
in the others)... although we know that the things we see are not real (or 
really happening), we (can) believe they are via the hypothesis of the 
Other for whom this performance is put up, or via the presupposition of 
some others who would believe the performance real. According to 
Mannoni, at stake here is the same kind of delegated belief that helps us 
to maintain, against our better knowledge, some of our own archaic 
beliefs which are banned by the demands of rationality that we live in. 
Although this structure of delegated belief, conceptualised by Mannoni 
and some others, is absolutely pertinent and applies to many a case of 
our everyday interactions, it is questionable if it indeed applies to 
theatrical illusion (or, more broadly, to other forms of artistic fiction). 
(Zupančič 2005: 176-178). 
 
 Zupančič 's investigation of ghostly dimension of the sneeze rises the 
complexity of the notion of object and its relation to the subject, almost in the 
same way as Mladen Dolar’s (cf. Dolar 2006) analysis and explanation gives a 
proper theoretical decency to the voice. So, Zupančič 's investigation on 
Mannoni's example through the Lacanian distinction between real and reality 
provides a whole other realm of consequences for this investigation, 
specifically when the thinker highlights: "that the real is not something to be 
unveiled or revealed under the always somehow deceiving reality (as 
essentially imaginary, or “fantasmatic”), but something to be constructed 
(which is different from being represented or imitated). This is why a certain 
dimension of what an artistic “fiction” produces can very well be the real". 
(Zupančič 2005: 177) Therefore, her examination on Pfaller's 'theoretical 
experiment' presents the tension between the logic of the uncanny and of the 
comical, grasping the depth of the blurred lines provided by those notions and in 
addition, reassuring a dark duplicity involved in those in-between reversals of 
nothing. This means that the theoretical construction provided by the thinker 
illustrates how that the comical and the uncanny partake in reversals of 
nothing. On one hand, the comical revolves around constitutive dislocation (as 
immanent nothing), because it enacts the object of the drive and participates 
into the psychoanalytic logic of Drives; the uncanny, on the other hand, derives 
from constitutive lack (as transcendent nothing), participates to the logic of 




desire. Therefore, the scenario lifted up by Pfaller finds through Zupančič's 
interpretation of Mannoni's example of the sneezing corpse, a whole new set of 
philosophical perspectives that could even reach the classic philosophical 
opposition of materialism versus transcendentalism. Zupančič's short-circuit 
between philosophy and psychoanalysis find through the reversals of 
nothingness a radical speculative depth to the very human experience of 
illusions. One could, intuitively, even say that such appropriation on the 
reversals of nothing, resembles what the Banach-Tarski paradox represents to 
mathematics. This productivity double aspect from nothingness, that Zupančič 
analysis from Pfaller's examination of Mannoni's example finds, forces us to 
look closely not only at illusions, but also, at nothingness as such.   
 
 Perhaps, this is why Pfaller's interpassivity changed so much over time, 
also giving us the reason why it became more and more obscure in its internal 
duplicity. Finally, if we go back to Pfaller's work from 2014, and carefully read 
the passage where the author sews the elements of interpassivity to the 
uncanny, we will be able to understand the point pursued throughout this 
article:  
 
If compulsive acts can be compared with magic, then it seems that so, 
too, can interpassivity's similarly compulsive substitute acts. Like 
compulsive acts, interpassive acts are substitutive and symbolic acts. 
They constitute attempts - using such symbols - to fend off what is 
symbolized by fiddling with symbols also correspond to the most 
common description of magic: with magic, it is typical that 'a symbol 
takes over the full functions of the thing it symbolizes'...This symbolic, 
figurative nature seems equally characteristic of magic acts, compulsive 
acts, and interpassive, substitute acts. In all three areas, this 
figurativeness is distorted beyond recognition in some cases, and can be 
clearly recognized in others...On the basis of these two misjudgements, 
interpassivity reveals a similarity to obsessional neuroses. There, too, 
inability to recognize the compulsive acts corresponds with the 
impossibility of experiencing them as pleasurable. (Pfaller 2014: 28-29) 
 
 So, reading closely this passage and paying attention towards what 
we've learned so far about 'thought experiments', also about the development 
of interpassivity over time and its articulation on the uncanny and the comical; it 
is plausible to assume, at first, that without the notion titled interpassivity, 
Pfaller breaks down Mannoni's example with the elements he has in hands – 
which is a 'thought experiment'. Of course, that the critical analysis of this 
particular example does not cover the whole recent designation of what 
interpassivity articulates – the conceptualization did become monstrous, in the 
sense that transcends its own form. But, perhaps through this brief archaeology 
of knowledge we've managed to see further on his research of interpassivity. 
Nonetheless, with the theoretical background of the uncanny and the comical, 
posing this formidable space of exploration for the author; Pfaller 
progressively, enlarged the viability of interpassivity into a formidable central 
notion, subsuming the uncanniness and the comical to its very own core. Even 




allowing the inference that Pfaller integrated Žižek's prescription of 
encompassing the tension of the double uncanny within interpassivity, perhaps 
just as much as Zupančič had done so in her study. Finally, another element that 
supports this claim, and which also provides ground this for interpretation, 
comes from the fact that Pfaller's more recent work Interpassivity (2017), only 
has three brief passages on the uncanny10 and one on the comical11. Not one of 
them vitally comes across the Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalytic description 
as a fundamental articulation of fundamental notions. It is almost as if 
interpassivity as such, had move past them. But have the notion of interpassivity 
let them go? Absolutely not. Therefore, it seems reasonable to propose that the 
notion of interpassivity now has this extimate quality inherited in its dna, 
working as its conceptual blueprint, perhaps for having subsumed the dark 
double uncanny and the comical of the past 'thought experiment' into the core of 
the current notion of interpassivity. Now, interpassivity renders a differentiate 
understanding to the uncanny and also, to the comical, but further studies are 
necessary to sustain this articulation.   
 
We still need to talk about obsessional neurosis: 
 
Different from the nosological approach that the medical discourse names 
obsessional compulsive disorder (OCD), it is necessary to understand the 
psychoanalytic etiology for obsessional neurosis in order to comprehend its 
core within interpassivity. So, without derailing so much from our main thread, 
let's move back to where this brief archeology of knowledge of interpassivity 
took us: obsessional neurosis for psychoanalysis. Freud tells us that the 
obsessional neurotic defense finds through symbolic 'rituals' a way to establish 
itself for the subject, which "led Freud's analysands to the idea of equating the 
symptoms of obsessional neuroses with those of religious life...if one compares 
compulsive acts with magic rather than religion, it seems that this difference, 
too, vanishes." (Pfaller 2014: 27) To a certain extent, to deal with obsessional 
neurosis in psychoanalysis is to bring Freud's largest investigation on that 
matter, especially the case of the 'Rat Man' [1909] back to life – of course, this 
article has no intentions of presenting the entire complexity of obsessional 
neurosis for Freud and or even more, to psychoanalysis itself; what we have 
here is simply a necessary approximation of core elements of obsessional 
neurosis that concerning interpassivity. Freud's investigation on the 
mechanisms of obsessional neurosis, such as omnipotence of thought, 
repetition and occurrences of symbolic causality, ties his most famous 
obsessional neurotic patient (the Rat Man) to the symptomatic responses he 
finds while investigating the Uncanny [1919]. Freud's final addition to this 
combination comes from the relationship of the uncanny to the mechanism of 
defense particular to obsessional neurotic patients, where basically the 
'ritualistic' procedure emerges as a possible symbolic defense for the subject. 
So, when the obsessional neurotic suffers from doubting if he or she, controls 
the very own fabric of reality through omnipotence of thought (which combines 
elements of animism with surpassed judgments) [1909], [1919], illusions and 
rationalizations clash against each other, leading the subject to a collapse. And 
then, such rituals appear to calm her or him down, taking the subject's attention 




away from a possible internal, intrapsychic conflict. But, how could a civilized, 
enlightened, educated individual not seem to realize that this does not make 
any sense? Freud struggles deeply against this realization, not because the 
obsessional does not realizes it, but specifically because he or she, does it. And 
yet, this belief that goes against reason, manifests itself anyway - it works like a 
magical act displayed by the subject - it is an act, that does not care if the subject 
believes in it or not. It simply finds its purpose for the obsessional neurotic. 
 
 Continuing this explanation, and also without the illusion of presenting 
the completion of obsessional neurosis for Lacan, the idea here is to take into 
consideration insights provided by the French psychoanalyst regarding this 
neurotic formation. In his fifth seminar called The Formations of the 
Unconscious (1957-58)12, Lacan explores the dialects of desire for neurosis and 
highlights pivotal characteristics of obsessional neurosis. Structurally, as the 
hysteric person, the obsessional finds herself or himself, having to deal with 
unsatisfied desire – experiencing it in many different ways and levels, but 
predominantly as lack. The particular aspect of obsessional neurosis has to do 
with how the subject deals with the appearance of desire, which is basically 
turning it into a forbidden desire out of it. It is supported through the Other but 
by its prohibition (cf. Lacan 1958: 291). This is way Lacan prescribed that: 'A 
whole part of analytic indoctrination is carried out in the line, according to the 
paths of obsessional wishes. So, the illusion, the very fantasy within range of 
the obsessional, is ultimately that the Other as such would consent to his 
desire… because what’s at stake is obtaining permission of the Other.' (Lacan 
1958: 291) To keep up with the appearances to the Other, to perform, to stage, or 
to act as if for the Other, is what Lacan presents as a fundamental mechanism 
for obsessional neurotic subjects.  
 
 The refinement given by Lacan to obsessional neurosis, relates to this 
imperative of sustaining theatrically the Other, staging to sustain it, not 
acknowledging that this dynamic is taking place. So, obsessional neurosis by 
principle, struggles with fantasies. Following Lacan's findings and his analysis 
of the obsessional neurotic, the problem for the subject is not this configuration 
per se, but when this configuration seems to collapse – when the Other seems 
to be at risk, its when the undead aspect obsessional neurosis seems to fringe. 
Therefore, this complex configuration behind all these grand gestures, all these 
exploits from the obsessional neurotic are connected to this structure and 
must, to a certain level, be kept hidden to herself or himself. All this inhuman 
effort to preserve and to maintain the Other, are staged by the obsessional 
"without the air of doing so, having the air of aiming at some other thing" (Lacan 
1958: 292) fundamentally, to sustain the Other as such and to keep its 
articulation of things in terms of signifier. And although Lacan's research on 
unconscious formations encountered within obsessional neurosis four pivotal 
traits for such modality of neurosis: fantasy, exploit, symptom and acting out; 
but, if we go back to the main focus of this article, we can now articulate the 
importance of sustaining the Other though fantasy for obsessional neurosis to 
the performative aspect portrayed by interpassivity.  
 




 So, Pfaller’s conceptual advances on interpassivity rescues this 
particular aspect regarding obsessional neurosis for Freud and Lacan, through 
Mannoni's example of the dead actor, which was previously discussed. All of 
them realized that obsessional neurotic subjects: '...have better knowledge 
available with which they can distance themselves from the illusion in question 
- although they cannot do so completely, since they simultaneously express a 
certain devotion to the illusion' (Pfaller 2014: 40). Therefore, the role of illusions 
is fundamental, but these illusions do not require a owner per se, it could be just 
the consideration that someone could believe in it. We could even infer that the 
omnipotence of thought for the interpassive subject deeply expresses 
retroactively for the subject the own neglected symbolic element of staging or 
acting as if, for the Other. The careful approximation and necessary distinction 
proposed by Mannoni while investigating belief, and which Pfaller takes 
advantage from, is regards the different qualities of disavowal between the 
obsessional neurotic and the fetishist. The author tells us that:    
 
Yet both types of disavowal, manifest illusions as well as latent ones, 
exhibit a shared defining characteristic: knowing better, which prevents 
actors from considering themselves as carriers of the illusion. If 
someone were to label them as the illusion’s carrier, then they would 
quite indignantly. (The fetishists and obsessional neurotics who operate 
with latent illusions would quite possibly also deny the symbolic 
character of their actions. That is, they would not only deny that they are 
the carriers of an illusion, but also that there is any type of illusion 
involved at all.)... The fetishist knows quite well (that the woman has no 
phallus), but the other phrase, 'quand même...', remains silent - it 
constitutes, as Mannoni writes, the fetish itself. The situation for 
neurotics is similar, even though the illusions that they deny (starting 
from the basic model of denial of the maternal phallus) have shifted to 
other issues. 
 
This difference between 'explicit' and 'silent' disavowal, which Mannoni 
dealt with only briefly, can possibly be explained as follows: there is 
disavowal in which the content of the illusion in question is manifest… 
with fetishism, as well as the obsessional neurotic's cermonial acts, the 
actor is not aware that anything at all is being depicted in their - usually 
secretly enacted, seemingly 'senseless' - acts. The symbolic character, 
figurativeness of the act, is lost to them, this the depicted illusion is not 
manifest.(Pfaller 2014: 39-41)  
 
 This distinction is vital, since it not only preserves the clinical validity of 
the etiology of obsessional neurosis and fetishisms for psychoanalysis, but it 
also provides in-depth insights regarding its differences even on a clinical level. 
In this sense, interpassivity provides a nuance to the exploration of disavowal, 
which is critical in the psychoanalytic diagnosis and conduction of an analysis. 
To a certain extent, interpassivity may enrich the clinical background of 
psychoanalysis by allowing an exploration of the discursive position of the 
subject in relationship to his or her illusions. Of course, this intuition needs 




further examination and proper exploration in order to sustain itself, but 
theoretically seems valid enough to explain some of the phenomena which 
appear in the psychoanalytic clinic.  
 
Considerations about Interpassivity and protests under neoliberalism:  
 
Could the notion of interpassivity portrayed by Pfaller provide insights on 
politics? As we've seen throughout this article, interpassivity has a certain 
paraconsistent fundamentation and it demands tension from most of the 
phenomena or situations it is exposed to. On Pfaller's latest work Interpassivity 
(2017), the author presents a new set of explanations to some of the curious 
formulations from his previous work On the Pleasure Principle in Culture 
(2014), for instance, how the attempt to resist the anti-cultural impulse can be 
precisely what simultaneously realizes it. As the author presents: 
'Interpassivity is thereby the creation of a compromise between cultural 
interests and latent cultural aversion.' (Pfaller 2014: 27) So, Pfaller formalizes 
that there are always two levels of delegation involved in interpassivity: the 
delegation of enjoyment and the delegation of belief (in the enacted 
performance of enjoyment). And this is why:  
 
Interpassivity is always carried out simultaneously at both of these 
levels: on the one hand, consumption is delegated to a consumption 
medium - for example, reading to a photocopier; on the other hand, the 
belief in the equivalence between the consumers and their vicarious 
consumption media must also be delegated. The interpassive subject 
does not personally believe that he or she has read via the copy machine; 
this belief is transferred to the scene's virtual audience. Delegated 
enjoyment thus always entails feigning enjoyment for an observing 
agency with the help of a consumption medium, and simultaneously 
surrendering belief in this feigned fiction to the observing agency. In 
every act of delegated enjoyment, there is both delegated enjoyment and 
delegated illusion. The enjoyment is delegated to a consumption 
medium, the illusion to an observing agency...The mischievous pleasure, 
which appears in some cases of interpassivity, such as that described by 
Žižek, seems to rest on the dual character of this withdrawal: having 
escaped both enjoyment and the illusion of enjoyment, and having 
delegated both to someone else, seems to be enormous fun. First, one 
withdraws from the enjoyment, then from the illusion of it - and 
apparently that produces new, even greater enjoyment. (Pfaller 2014: 
30-32)  
 
 This particular duplicity within interpassivity provides formidable 
insights to approach mass-psychology (cf. Pfaller 2017: 205) and furthermore, 
forces our attention to a group formation not from the standpoint of 
identification, but from delegation. Well, nowadays, there is a lot of discussions 
about demonstrations and protests, especially under the current neoliberal 
conditions, where "it can be seen how this categorical imperative of our culture 
leads to most affirmative forms of pseudo-emancipatory politics, and even of 




self-exploitation" (Pfaller 2017: 79). Let's think here of massive protests that 
feel, look or sound, like rave parties (or any music show you could think of), or 
political protests and manifestations, which are remarkably similar to art 
exhibitions and so on. And considering interpassivity applied to mass-
psychology, we could perhaps read the particular double aspect of delegated 
pleasure at work in this situation as well.  
 
 For instance, let's hypothetically consider an interpassive protest, on a 
first level, it would take place when protesters act as if or stage a 
transformation through a demonstration or a protest which defend forms of 
pseudo-emancipatory politics and ideals of self-exploitation. Lately, 
considering protests post-2008, a lot of flags were risen seeking precisely that. 
Going back to this hypothetical interpassive protest, we could see on a material 
level, a large or massive group is indeed 'protesting' but subjectively – who 
could tell for sure what is going? Like Pfaller posits: '...many practices of 
contemporary culture do, indeed, develop in the direction of increased ‘avoiding 
through playing’, common sense’s difficulties in thinking are all the more 
conspicuous. What remains unnoticed in theory enjoys increasing popularity in 
practice.' (Pfaller 2017: 12) So, could perhaps this massive group of people that 
show up nowadays in protests be performing this pseudo-emancipatory 
politics in order to prevent a change to take place? Could this performative 
action have transformed itself into an avoidance through practice, just as Žižek 
understands a product’s function of avoidance to its consumer? If so, the type of 
demands echoing from such protests should resemble an obsessional neurotic 
mode of suffering in neoliberalism. Then, this interpassive protest would be as if 
the demands of the demonstrators were (unknowingly) sustaining the desire of 
keeping things as they are – and doing it through the very own act of fighting for 
transformations – well, basically, interpassivity allow us to see how public 
demonstrations could indeed stage a change only to sustains the Other. In this 
conceptual experiment of conceiving an interpassive protest, its logic tells us 
that far from provoking a productive nothingness from a void created when the 
Other seems suspended (something that would resemble more the hysterical 
discursive demand in Lacanian terms) - this type of protests hardly seem to 
reach such level – interpassive demonstrations stage the transformation 
sustaining the Other. Like a symptomatic ritual, interpassive protests ask for 
changes just to keep everything in order, quite close to the logic of obsessional 
neurosis and the Other for Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
 
 In this extrapolation, an interpassive protest takes place perduring the 
most twisted type of narcissism displayed by individuals since modernity – it is 
an "act" to keep things as they are – where individuals gladly delegate their own 
demands to someone who actually believes that protests could change things, 
once they themselves know they do not. And since engagement seems out of 
the question, since no serious commitment is viable for neoliberal subjects, an 
interpassive protest, thrives on the fulfillment of delegation of the political 
thought to this ghostly third party through the practice of protesting. This 
interpassive practice illustrates the presupposition that a group can actually 
give a voice to those who cannot voice their own demands – this is staging an act 




through an act. Considering the different levels of this interpassive act, 
especially when it becomes an 'act as if'; an interpassive protest allows for 
individuals to get rid of their intrapsychic dilemmas and to sustain the real of 
Capital – that keep up with the economy and its neoliberal agenda - without a 
scratch. Indeed, this is nothing but an extrapolation from the concept, but it 
seems like an interesting formulation to be further pursued.  
 
 When Adorno and Horkheimer developed the notion of culture industry 
(1944), they described culture as a paradoxical commodity; where the law of 
exchange had devoured it completely, up to the point it can no longer exchange 
and being so blindly consumed that it can no longer be used. This harsh attempt 
to demonstrate the totality of capitalism going beyond the gates of factories and 
into the reality of culture, consequently finds no great promises for culture. But, 
interpassivity provides a critical consideration to culture that moves beyond 
this first diagnostic. The predicament of capitalism is already here, so the time 
for old utopian answers and external solutions do not seem to work no more. It 
all becomes immediately ideological, it feels even naive to presuppose 
something better than their spoken names. (Pfaller 2017: 81) And Žižek's 
philosophical materialism seems to provide the necessary tools to fight the 
struggles of post-modernity and also, the political-economical construction of 
society under a neoliberal paradigm. One of his theoretical explorations is the 
notion of belief within capitalism and without it, interpassivity could not be as 
critical as it is in a social level.  
 
 As previously established, interpassivity occurs through the illusion of 
this naive someone or, in other words, the one who actually believes in the 
Adam Smith's fairytale of the free market as a self-regulatory entity, so that the 
debt of the virtualized wealth that Keynesians are so fond of, may never be 
charged. This ghostly element sustains for the interpassive subjects the 
uncanny illusion of economy propagated in neoliberalism ideology. And this 
capitalist uncanniness is fundamentally grasped by interpassivity. In Mark 
Fisher's most notorious work, Capitalist realism: is there no alternative? (2009), 
the author articulates interpassivity and the Disney film Wall-E (2008) showing 
that ‘the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to 
consume with impunity. The role of capitalist ideology is not to make an explicit 
case for something in the way that propaganda does, but to conceal the fact that 
the operations of capital do not depend on any sort of subjectively assumed 
belief’ (Fisher 2009: 13). Borrowing from Fisher’s reading of interpassivity on of 
this Disney film, we can understand the relevance of such concept in order to 
portray a guiding mechanism of capitalist realism13. For Fisher, the notion of 
super-identification with capital and the possibility of consuming its own 
criticism seems to be the proper mechanisms of interpassivity. An 
understanding corroborated by Pfaller's especifically on passages about 
extreme narcissism, the pseudo-transformative aspect of affirmative politics 
and the individuals defense of self-exploitation. (Pfaller 2017: 79)  
 
 Further than that, interpassivity renders the role of belief within 
capitalism and consequently, on the cynical subjective state of people. Žižek's 




explanation on belief (cf. Žižek 2009a: 93: 206) within capitalism is a common 
ground between Pfaller (cf. Pfaller 2017: 38-40) and Fisher (cf. Fisher 2008: 13: 
15: 78). Interpassivity translates the performative gesture of neoliberal people, 
that “...believe that money is only a meaningless token of no intrinsic worth, yet 
we act as if it has a holy value.” (Fisher 2008: 13) So, the critical value of 
interpassivity as a theoretical tool connects with this ability of identifying the 
role of belief and cynicism - it is a tool which can and must be used from within, 
instead of an external thought experiment. As Fisher elaborates:  
 
To reclaim a real political agency means first of all accepting our 
insertion at the level of desire in the remorseless meat-grinder of 
Capital. What is being disavowed in the abjection of evil and ignorance 
onto fantasmatic Other is our own complicity in planetary networks of 
oppression. What needs to be kept in mind is both that capitalism is a 
hyper-abstract impersonal structure and that it would be nothing 
without our co-operation. The most Gothic description of Capital is also 
the most accurate. Capital is an abstract parasite, an insatiable vampire 
and zombie-maker; but the living flesh it converts into dead labor is ours, 
and the zombies it makes are us. There is a sense in which it simply is the 
case that the political elite are our servants; the miserable service they 
provide from us is to launder our libidos, to obligingly re-present for us 
our desavowed desires as if they had nothing to do with us” (Fisher 2008: 
15)   
 
 Interpassivity is a necessary critical tool for rendering capitalist realism 
and the neoliberal paradigm of society. Cultural and political tensions are 
forced through interpassivity to collapse on themselves, and human suffering is 
extimate, par excellance. Therefore, a more classic dichotomy of philosophy 
between internality and external does not seem to fit to translate interpassive 
phenomena. The duplicity within interpassivity, its extimate conceptual 
blueprint, allow it to become a proper tool for the diagnosis of the illusions 
without owners surrounding reality. So, in political and social terms, the old 
naive position of an external element which would come and transform reality 
does not work anymore. Fidelity, engagement and commitment are rare 
commodities within neoliberalism. This is why Fisher’s prognosis seems so 
bitter: “Without a credible and coherent alternative to capitalism, capitalist 
realism will continue to rule the political-economic unconscious” (Fisher 2009: 
78). It is in the realm of the political-economic unconscious that this battle is 
lost, the suggestions to change are pseudo-emancipatory symptomatic 
repetitions. Interpassivity, on the other hand, forces its way into the undead 
default mode of human existence after 2008, seeking a viable tool to create 
something else. Interpassivity pays attention to the undead likeness of social 
behaviors, puts under its scope the empty gestures and claims for the 
resignification of these particular practices. Perhaps, examining interpassivity 
in the realm of politics will allow a better understanding of historical 
symptomatic repetitions and forcing the consideration of illusions that 
participate into this equation, and therefore, pushing towards a way out or into 
an alternative direction. A credible and coherent alternative for the political-




economic unconscious which is now ruled by the real of Capital, hopefully could 
emerge from the critical examination of interpassivity, pointing out towards a 
resignification of old utopic answers and practices derived from it, aiming at a 
theoretical-practice that understands reality not ignoring or neglecting the role 
of illusions, but considering its value for interpassive actions displayed by 




Interpassivity proves itself to be a vast notion in the realm of speculative 
philosophical thought. It pays attention to illusions within reality and proves to 
be a concept which demands a whole theoretical development. The conceptual 
construction deals with the paradoxical dimension of delegated enjoyment, 
which is portrayed by magnificent and curious examples, such as: a former 
alcoholic addict that becomes a great host of parties and enjoys filling the 
glasses of your guests, or delegating our enjoyment to some object, like an 
intellectual could find satisfaction in taking copies of the books she or he was 
suppose to be reading. This paradoxical theoretical concept provides a closer 
look to the paradoxes of reality – it is a analytical tool to examine the illusions 
which are embedded in the construction of everyday life. The effort of this 
article was to portray through a brief archaeology of knowledge, how Pfaller 
manage to integrate a tension of oppositions within the very own core of 
interpassivity – namely, the logic of the uncanny and of the comical. But this 
central element gained more layers of complexification through time, 
permitting interpassivity to re-enter the realm of psychoanalysis providing a 
new conceptual took to the clinic. The relevance of interpassivity to the 
psychoanalytic clinic comes from its closer look at obsessional neurosis and 
fetishism through its detailed formulations on the relationship of subjects to 
illusions. Moreover, the conceptualization of interpassivity earns further 
relevance when it manages to examine the realm of political-economic 
unconscious, proving itself to be a crucial concept in order to analyse, 
comprehend and criticize the paradigm of neoliberal suffering for individuals 
and perhaps, even to formulate viable alternatives to its conundrum.      
 
                                                        
1 Dolar's examination of the uncanny experience of the subject through psychoanalysis, posits 
the crucial necessity of a bridging notion between interior and exterior, differently than the 
traditional opposition of interior versus exterior. As Dolar puts it: "All the great philosophical 
conceptual pairs - essence/appearance, mind/body, subject/object, spirit/matter, etc. - can be 
seen as just so many transcriptions of the division between interiority and exteriority. Now the 
dimension of extimité blurs this line. It points neither to the interior nor to the exterior but is 
located there where the most intimate interiority coincides with the exterior and becomes 
threatening, provoking horror and anxiety. The extimate is simultaneously the intimate kernel 
and the foreign body; in a world, it is unheimlich." (cf. Dolar 1991: 6) The approach to this in-
between quality of extimate to interpassivity, as suggested here, is nothing but an attempt to 
help us assimilate some of its intrinsic particularities. See also Lacan (cf. 1969: 100-114) and 
Gonsalves (cf. 2006: 25-25: 44: 95). 
2 Pfaller uses Žižek's example of the Tibetan prayer wheels to illustrate interpassivity on a few 
passages of his book, each time rendering more depth to his interpretation. Žižek's passage 




                                                                                                                                                              
goes as follows: [I] write a prayer on a paper, put the rolled paper into a wheel, and turn it 
automatically, without thinking [...] The beauty of it all is that in my psychological interiority I can 
think about whatever I want, I can yield to the most dirty and obscene fantasies, and it does not 
matter because – to use a good old Stalinist expression – whatever I am thinking, objectively I 
am praying. (Žižek 1997: 34) (Pfaller 2017: 30) and he continues interpreting such phenomena as: 
"The anonymous belief that allows us not to believe is established through performing the 
ritual. This objective illusion is at work in almost all ritual religious practices. Therefore, we can 
say that there exists a profound interpassivity of the ritual as such. Through rituals, individuals 
delegate their religious beliefs to interpassive media." (Pfaller 2017: 61) This is the formulation 
of the 'ora pro nobis', very common in religious ritualistic experience which designates 'to pray 
(and believe) in our place.' (Ibid:44)   
3 Which could literally be anyone, since the point was not necessarily the person having a beer 
with Kafka, but Kafka himself having a beer through others. Kafka's own ability of finding this as 
a solution to his predicament - having tuberculosis and wishing for a beer - says about the 
viable capability of one satisfying himself or herself through the consumption of others, which is 
better than not having any satisfaction whatsoever (Pfaller 2017: 41).   
4 Benefiting from psychoanalysis, Pfaller reads the Freudian notion of 'substitutive act' (cf. 
Freud [1909]: 243; [1907]: 124f.), where "interpassive people substitute one act with another by 
investing the latter with psychic energy that was previously bound to the first."  
5 Žižek instigates the following reading of the interpassive subject: 'Against this background, it is 
tempting to supplement the fashionable notion of "interactivity" with its shadowy and much 
more uncanny double, the notion of "interpassivity."' The Interpassive Subject. Centre Georges 
Pompidou. Paris, Traverses. 1998. Accessed on: <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-
pompidou2.htm>. And later on, in 2009, in an article with the same name that reinforces that 
passage: 'To grasp properly this strange process [interpassivity], one should supplement the 
fashionable notion of interactivity, with its uncanny double, interpassivity'. (accessed on: 
http://www.lacan.com/essays/?p=143#_ftn2)  
6 Cf. Octave Mannoni, Clefs pour l’Imaginaire, Seuil, Paris 1969, pp. 161–183.  
7 Pfaller gives an elegant definition for interpassivity and its paradoxical dimension: "When 
dealing with people who display the tendency to delegate their own enjoyment to other people 
or to an apparatus, we are here unsuspectingly confronted with the fact that people enact 
illusions dramatically, with great precision, without noticing in the slightest that they are doing 
so. It is obvious that they know better, but they behave contrary to this knowledge in compliance 
with illusions of which they are not even aware. They produce imagination without any image. 
The method that interpassive subjects employ in their flight from enjoyment thereby leads us to 
the trail of imaginations without owners.’’ (Ibid.: 15)  
8 Lacan, Seminaire XVI.  
9 Lacan, Jacques. Seminar VII - Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1986: 295. 
10 On pages 105 and 109 of his more recent work, there are three passages where the term 
uncanny is utilized. The term has a descriptional aspect to it, places the uncanny as a quality 
derived from the psychoanalytic transference, described by Pfaller as a 'certain way of relating 
to the other' (Pfaller 2017: 108).        
11 On a brief description of a behavior demonstrated through interpassivity (Pfaller 2017: 27). 
12 Lacan, Jacques. Les formations de l’inconscient (1957-58), [282-302] 
13 Fisher's notion of capitalist realism emcompasses, in short, the ideological model of post-
Fordism economic based societies, where its mechanisms reinforce neoliberal capitalism as 
the only single possible form for economical reality. Fundamentally, that the real of Capital 
finds through neoliberalism a complementary ideology which propagates it as something 
untouchable and that its transformation or changes are simply unthinkable or impossible. 
Fisher elaborates that “‘[b]eing realistic’ may once have meant coming to terms with of a reality 
experienced as solid and immovable. Capitalist realism, however, entails subordinating oneself 
to a reality that is infinitely plastic, capable of reconfiguring itself at any moment.” (Fisher 2009: 
54) This environment of instability in reality, leads to feelings of anxieties and fears, these are 
part of specific modalities of human suffering aprioristically captured by Capital, so that the real 
of Capital, does not have to be transformed - an undead like existence. These undead traits are 
the current modalities of human suffering, matching the excessive narcissism and cynicism as 




                                                                                                                                                              
suitable symptoms for neoliberal subjects. To suffer within neoliberalism is an individual 
experience and if you are suffering it is due to your own inability – you are the one to blame for 
"missing out" – and, such modality of suffering do not allow subjects to reach the real or the 
social aspect of their own suffering, which is capitalism. This is a much broader discussion, 
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